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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the right.27 The fact that the trial judge appointed counsel
at the sentencing stage does not show that accused was not
competent to waive counsel at other stages of the proceed-
ings.25
On appeal, every reasonable presumption should be
against waiver of such an important constitutional right.2
If waiver is to be permitted3 ° it should at least appear
affirmatively in the record that accused was informed of his
right to counsel and intelligently choose to waive it.2' This
should make trial judges more conscientious in informing
accused of their rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SUPPRESSION OF COERCED CONFESSIONS
Appellants were arrested by F.B.I. agents for the illegal
possession of stolen goods and confessions were obtained. Al-
leging the confessions to have been illegally obtained," ap-
pellants, prior to indictment, petitioned the district court
to suppress them and to restrain the United States Attorney
from using them as evidence. The district judge, without
27. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945). At least whatever inference
can be drawn is answered by allegation of no waiver. Question
of fact arises.
28. Cartes v. Illinois, 67 S.Ct. 216 (1946).
29. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,468 (1937). A conflict of pre-
sumptions arises. Which should prevail, every reasonable pre-
sumption against waiver of important constitutional rights or pre-
sumption of regularity of judgment of a court when collaterally
attacked by habeas corpus?
30. See Douglas, Murphy, and Black, J.J. dissenting in Adams v. U.S.
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,282 (1942). Query under this view
if counsel could ever be waived at all.
31. See Justice Murphy dissenting in Carter v. Illinois, 67 S. Ct. 216,
222 (1946). Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,465 (1937) (though
not necessary it would be fitting and proper).
See Rules of the Indiana Supreme Court, Rule 1-11, Novem-
ber 6, 1946. With a plea of guilty in felony cases, the judge
shall cause a record to be made of the entire proceedings in con-
nection with arraignment and sentencing.
There is a possibility that the affirmative statement might
become a mere formal matter of record.
1. Appellants alleged the confessions were obtained by threats of
physical violence and other coercive measures. Appellants also
contended that search of a rubber cement plant and seizure of
certain documents were conducted under a warrant unlawfully
issued. However, the district judge found that the search and
seizure was conducted with the written consent of the appellants
voluntarily given. This ruling was affirmed in the principal case.
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hearing evidence, dismissed the petition on the ground that
the court lacked power to suppress the confessions prior to
indictment even if they had been illegally obtained. Held:
If the confessions were obtained in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, they should be suppressed and not admitted in
evidence for either indictment or trial. In re Fried, et al,
F.(2d) (C.C.A. 2d, 1947).
The effect of the decision is to extend to confessions
procured in violation of the Fifth Amendment the benefits of
a well settled federal rule permitting the suppression as ev-
idence of articles seized in violation of the Fou'rth Amend-
ment.
2
The government argued that an indictment founded up-
on illegally obtained evidence would do the appellants no harm
since the evidence would not be admitted at the trial follow-
ing indictment. To this argument, Judge Frank replied that
wrongful indictment worked an irreparable injury to the per-
son indicted, the stigma of which was not easily erased by a
subsequent judgment of not guilty.
Judges Frank and L. Hand disagreed as to how far the
innovation announced in the case should be extended. While
both agreed it should apply when a constitutional !right had
been violated, Judge Frank wished to go further and extend
it to those cases in which federal officers in obtaining a con-
fession had violated a federal statute governing their author-
ity.
The Indiana courts have followed the federal rule in sup-
pressing as evidence articles illegally seized. 3 There is also
2. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court in Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S.
616 (1885), is credited with the original fusion of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments of the federal constitution. It was there held
that the production in evidence of the fruits of a search and
seizure conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment would
also violate the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendent.
The rule laid down in the Boyd case excluding such evidence as
being self-incriminating has been followed in subsequent decisions
of the federal courts. U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932);
Gould v. U.S., 255 U.S. 298 (1920); Harris v. U.S., 151 F.(2d)
837 (C.C.A. 10th, 1945), cert. granted, 66 Sup. Ct. 1360 (1946);
U.S. v. Mills, 185 Fed. 318 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1911).
3. The Indiana Supreme Court by a synthesis of sections 11 (search-
es and seizures) and 14 (self-incrimination) of Art. 1 of the Ind.
Const. has held that papers and articles obtained by illegal search-
es and seizures are not admissible in evidence. Fluin v. State, 193
Ind. 585, 141 N.E. 353 (1923); Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91,
138 N.E. 817 (1922); Twomley, "The Indiana Bill of Rights,"
(1944) 20 Ind. L.J. 211,239.
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sufficient constitutional authority in Indiana to permit the
extension of the rule announced in the principal case.4 While
such an extension would seem to be a logical cdrollary con-
sistent with the theory of the rule, at least one Indiana case
has refused to extend to confessions, the remedy allowed in
the case of unlawful searches and seizures.5
DAMAGES
RECOVERY FOR LOSS OF USE OF DESTROYED AUTOMOBILE
Plaintiff's truck was destroyed and due to postwar short-
ages, he could not obtain another for eight months. In a
suit for damages for the negligent destruction of the truck,
an additional sum was asked to compensate for lost use. Held:
Motion to strike allegation of damages for lost use from the
complaint sustained. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Harrell, 66
F. Supp. 559 (W.D. Okla. 1946).
That damages cannot be recovered for loss of use of a
destroyed chattel is clearly the general rule.' But the rule
is based upon the normal availability of replacements and the
plaintiff's duty to replace the property. In 1945, with ab-
normal conditions prevailing because of the war, the plaintiff
was unable to fulfill his duty of replacement.
The court based its decision not only on the rule of dam-
ages stated above, but on the furthdr point that defendant's
4. Ind. Const. Art. I, §14: "No person shall be put in jeopardy twice
for the same offense. No person, in any criminal prosecution,
shall be compelled to testify against himself."
5. "The appellant sought to follow the procedure for quashing a
search warrant and suppressing the evidence procured thereunder,
which is not an appropriate practice in case of confessions."
Kokenes v. State, 213 Ind. 476,481, 13 N.E. (2d) 524,526 (1938).
1. Barnes v. United Rys. and Elec. Co. of Baltimore, 140 Md. 14, 116
Atl. 855 (1922); German v. Centaur Lime Co., 295 S.W. 475 (St.
Louis C.A. 1927) (relied on heavily in decision of instant case);
Adams v. Bell Motors Inc., 9 La. App. 441, 121 So. 345 (1928);
Colonial Motor Coach Corp. v. New York Cent. R.R., 131 Misc.
891, 228 N.Y.S. 508 (S. Ct. 1928); Johnson v. Thompson, 35 Ohio
App. 91, 172 N.E. 298 (1929). See 6 Blashfield, "Cyclopedia of
Automobile Law and Practice" (Penn. ed. 1945)41: "Where an
automobile is practically destroyed, or so completely destroyed
as not to be susceptible of repair, the mesure of damages is its
reasonable market value immediately before the accident, without
any additional allowance for hiring another car." Damages have
been disallowed for lost use when the automobile, although it could
be partially repaired, could not be restored to as good a condition
as before the accident. Helin v. Egger, 121 Neb. 727, 238 N.W.
364 (1931).
